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Predictive judicial analytics holds the promise of increasing the fair-
ness of law. Much empirical work observes inconsistencies in judicial
behavior. By predicting judicial decisions—with more or less accuracy
depending on judicial attributes or case characteristics—machine learn-
ing offers an approach to detecting when judges most likely to allow ex-
tralegal biases to influence their decision making. In particular, low pre-
dictive accuracy may identify cases of judicial “indifference,” where case
characteristics (interacting with judicial attributes) do no strongly dis-
pose a judge in favor of one or another outcome. In such cases, biases
may hold greater sway, implicating the fairness of the legal system.
Introduction
There is ample social scientific evidence documenting arbitrariness, un-
fairness, and discrimination in the U.S. legal system. To give just a flavor
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of the relevant research:
• U.S. federal appeals court judges become more politicized before
elections and more unified during war (Berdejo and Chen 2016;
Chen 2016b).
• Refugee asylum judges are 2 percentage points more likely to deny
asylum to refugees if their previous decision granted asylum (Chen,
Moskowitz, and Shue 2016).
• Politics and race also appear to influence judicial outcomes (Schanzen-
bach 2005; Bushway and Piehl 2001; Mustard 2001; Steffensmeier
and Demuth 2000; Albonetti 1997; Thomson and Zingraff 1981;
Abrams, Bertrand, and Mullainathan 2012; Boyd, Epstein, and Mar-
tin 2010; Shayo and Zussman 2011) as does masculinity (Chen,
Halberstam, and Yu 2016b, 2016a), birthdays (Chen and Philippe
2017), football game outcomes (Chen 2017; Eren and Mocan 2016),
time of day (Chen and Eagel 2016; Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-
Pesso 2011), weather (Barry et al. 2016), name (Chen 2016a), and
shared biographies (Chen et al. 2016) or dialects (Chen and Yu
2016).
• There are also various papers showing clear judicial biases in lab-
oratory environments, such as the influence of anchoring, fram-
ing, hindsight bias, representative heuristics, egocentric bias, snap
judgments, and inattention (Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2000,
2007; Rachlinski et al. 2009; Rachlinski, Wistrich, and Guthrie 2013;
Simon 2012).
Thus, the primary question is not whether these problematic features
of the legal system exist. Rather, the dilemma facing policymakers is
what, if anything, can be done. This comment will argue that predic-
tive judicial analytics in the form of applied statistical/machine learning
(from causal inference to deep learning) holds at least some promise on
this front.
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Prior empirical work has focused on evaluating judges to observe the
influences on their behavior, helping to diagnose the problem of bias but
offering little in terms of remedy. The advent of machine learning tools
and their integration with legal data offers a mechanism to detect in real
time, and thereby remedy judicial behavior that undermines the rule of
law. This commentary presents a conceptual framework for understand-
ing a large set of behavioral findings on judicial decision-making and
then taking steps to ensure more fair treatment of legal subjects by the
legal system.
The theoretical basis for the following argument is the observation
that behavioral biases are most likely to manifest in situations where
judges are closer to indifference between options. Such contexts are also
those where there are likely to be the highest levels of disparities in inter-
judge accuracy of algorithms predicting judicial decisions—essentially
conditions where judges are unmoved by legally relevant circumstances.
If algorithms can identify the contexts that are likely to give rise to bias,
they can also reduce those biases through behavioral nudges and other
mechanisms, such as through judicial education. The following discus-
sion fleshes out these claims.
The Problem of Indifference
Imagine a legal outcome of interest, such as asylum designations by im-
migration judges. Let’s denote that outcome Y . Imagine further that
there is some set of covariates (or “features” in the language of machine
learning) X such that these features can be used to generate predictions
of Y via some function Y = f (X) + ε where ε denotes some small “error”
or variation. The covariates X are legally relevant in as much as prevailing
legal norms require or least permit their use by legal decisionmakers for
the relevant decision. In the case of an asylum adjudication, the political
circumstances of an applicant’s home country would be legally relevant.
There might also be a set of covariates W that are legally irrelevant,
and that should not predict a legal outcome: y ⊥ W,var(ε) ⊥ W . The
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set W might include litigant characteristics that decisionmakers are not
permitted to take into account—such as race—or they may include irrel-
evant features in the environment, such as the weather. Since judges are
randomly assigned, judicial characteristics fall into W , because the judge
that a litigant randomly draws is not legally relevant to the outcome of
a decision. Of course, as mentioned briefly above, there is a substan-
tial literature showing that features in W in fact are predictive of legal
outcomes in a variety of settings (Berdejo and Chen 2016; Chen 2016b;
Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue 2016; Schanzenbach 2005; Bushway and
Piehl 2001; Mustard 2001; Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000; Albonetti
1997; Thomson and Zingraff 1981; Abrams, Bertrand, and Mullainathan
2012; Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010; Shayo and Zussman 2011; Chen
and Philippe 2017; Eren and Mocan 2016; Chen 2017; Chen and Eagel
2016; Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso 2011; Barry et al. 2016; Chen
et al. 2016; Chen and Yu 2016).
The preferences of decisionmakers (e.g., judges) overX may also affect
the influence of W over outcomes. A judge could be said to have strong
preferences over X when it is costly to depart from the legally optimal
outcome, defined as the outcome that would be generated through con-
sideration of X alone. Judges might have such strong preferences based
on ideology, or personal psychology, or some set of institutional charac-
teristics. But a judge may also have weak preferences over X, meaning
that there was a relatively low cost in departing from the legally optimal
outcome. In such cases of legal indifference, the factors within W can be
expected to have greater influence. Stated another way, when the predic-
tive power of X wanes, the potential scope of influence for W waxes.
A Role for Machine Learning
Chen et al. (2017) conceptualize the notion of early predictability. The
basic idea is that machine learning could be used to automatically de-
tect judicial indifference—i.e., instances where the judges appear to ig-
nore the circumstances of the case when making decisions. This infor-
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mation could then be used to trigger de-biasing information or other in-
terventions to prevent decisions that would undermine the fair and non-
arbitrary operation of the justice system.
How would this work? Continuing our example, let’s consider asylum
courts. In this important context it turns out that using only the informa-
tion that is available at the time that a case opens, judges (those with the
highest and lowest grant rates) are much more predictable than others
(Chen et al. 2017). These judges seem to have strong prior preferences
concerning outcomes and the legally irrelevant fact that an applicant is
assigned to a low- or high-grant rate judge largely determines outcomes.
There is, however, a category of less predicable judges and these judges
tend to have middling grant rates. Given their unpredictability, one pos-
sibility is that they lack strong preferences, and are therefore guided by
random factors when making a decision—essentially flipping a coin. An-
other possibility is that they are more sensitive to the circumstances of
the cases. There is some evidence pointing to this second alternative: the
less predictable judges also tend to have substantially more hearing ses-
sions than the judges who rarely grant asylum.1
At this level of granularity—identifying judges whose behavior is pre-
dictable at relatively early procedural stages—some interventions might
be possible. For example, training programs could be targeted toward
these judges, either with the goal of de-biasing or to help them learn how
to use the hearing process to better advantage. Simply alerting judges to
the fact that their behavior is highly predictable in ways that may indicate
unfairness may be sufficient to change their behavior.
Higher levels of granularity in the analysis may free up even more tar-
geted interventions. It may be possible, for example, to not only identify
early deciding judges, but also to examine how case characteristics inter-
1. Interestingly, judges who grant at a high rate also hold relatively more hearing ses-
sions, perhaps to collect more information to justify their likely more controversial deci-
sion.
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act with this judicial attribute to learn the types of case-judge pairs that
are most predictable at early stages. When such pairs are found, judges
can be given a ‘red flag’ that they should be particularly attuned to sub-
sequent information, essentially as a counter-weight to confirmation bias
or other non-legal sources of influence.
Just as machine learning can be used to identify judges who tend to
be unmoved by legally relevant factors, these techniques can also be used
detect instances where judicial decisions can be predicted by legally irrel-
evant factors. There is a substantial social science literature establishing
this possibility, and in the asylum example, Chen and Eagel (2016) finds
these influences are highly prevalent. They include: whether a hearing
was before lunch or towards the end of the day; the size of the applicant’s
family; the weather; the number of recent grants by the court; whether
genocide has been in the news; and the date of the decision. While the lit-
erature typically studies one behavioral feature at a time, Chen and Eagel
(2016) demonstrates the possibility for machine learning to automate the
detection of inconsistencies between judges due to legally irrelevant fac-
tors.
The asylum example is just one of many where machine learning tech-
niques can be use to detect bias. Amaranto et al. (2017) uses a very large
data set concerning prosecutorial decisions in New Orleans over a twelve-
year period (430,000 charges and 145,000 defendants) to test for racial
bias and the effectiveness of prosecutors in pursuing the riskiest defen-
dants. The authors construct a predictive model of recidivism and then
test if prosecutors who are relatively strict (i.e., drop relatively few cases)
screen based on risk of recidivism. In fact, more stringent prosecutors do
not appear to target riskier defendants, and this phenomenon has differ-
ential effects across races, with less risky African-American defendants
actually receiving relatively harsh treatment.
More generally, machine learning techniques can be used on data of
any sort, and in the context of a legal decision, a wide range of data, from
the weather conditions to judge characteristics, have proven informative.
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Given the textual nature of the law, and the importance of argumenta-
tion and reason-giving to legal decision making, there is a substantial
amount of textual data that can be used to examine how legally relevant
and legally irrelevant factors affect legal outcomes. For example, Ash and
Chen (2017) use judges’ writings to predict the average harshness and
racial and sex disparities in sentencing decisions. That work finds that
the information contained in written opinions can improve significantly
on naive prediction of punitiveness and disparity.
Again, this information could be used to aid decision makers in ways
that reduce bias in the system. Informing judges about the predictions
made by a model decision maker could help reduce judge-level variation
and arbitrariness. Potential biases that have been identified in prior deci-
sions or writing could be brought to a judge’s attention, where they could
be subjected to higher order cognitive scrutiny. Such efforts would build
on the already significant push to integrate risk-assessment into the crim-
inal justice process to help inform judges of the objective risks posed by
defendants.
Judicial Education
An additional pathway for machine learning to improve the quality of
legal decision making is by informing, and to some extent comprising,
efforts at judicial education. The first goal would be to expose judges
to findings concerning the effects of legally relevant and legally irrele-
vant factors on decisions, with the goal of general rather than specific de-
biasing. For example, Pope, Price, and Wolfers (2013) found that aware-
ness of racial bias among NBA referees subsequently reduced that bias.
The second goal would be to educate legal decision makers in the tools of
data analysis, so that they can become better consumers of this informa-
tion when it is present during legal proceedings, and to more generally
provide a set of thinking tools for understanding inference, prediction,
and the conscious and unconscious factors that may influence their deci-
sion making.
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Efforts at judicial education have had considerable success in the past.
By 1990, 40% of federal judges had attended an economics-training pro-
gram. This law and economics program was founded in 1976 as a two-
week training course with lectures by Nobel Prize economists Milton
Friedman, Paul Samuelson, and other luminaries. Ash, Chen, and Naidu
(2017) tests for effects from this training, finding dramatic results. Eco-
nomics language used in academic articles become rapidly prevalent in
judicial opinions. Economics training affects both the trained judges and
their peers as economic language travels from one judge to another and
across legal areas. Perhaps most tangibly, economics training changed
how judges perceived the consequence of their decisions. Judges in eco-
nomic regulation cases shifted their votes in an anti-regulatory direction
by 10%. In the district courts, when judges were given discretion in sen-
tencing, economics trained judges immediately rendered 20% longer sen-
tences relative to the non-economics counterparts.
Part of what made the economics training program successful is likely
because theory provided structure for judges to understand the patterns
they saw. The question for theorists and researchers now is whether ma-
chine learning, text-as-data analysis, and other similar developments al-
low for a further step. If judges are shown the behavioral findings, will
they become less prone to behavioral biases? If judges are taught theo-
retical structure that drive the behavioral bias, will they become better
judges? Could a new generation of theory and evidence from behavioral
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